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I. Introduction 
During the early 1980s a series of events occurred that altered the regulatory, political, and 
scholarly underpinnings of bank merger regulation. New laws that deregulated financial institu-
tions increased actual and potential competition in banking markets. Consistent with the laissez 
faire spirit of this deregulation, the Reagan Justice Department relaxed its enforcement of the 
merger antitrust laws. New banking cost studies produced lower estimates of optimal bank scale, 
suggesting that small banks might be more effective rivals of large full service banks than previ-
ously thought. New studies in industrial organization began to question the traditional notion that 
concentration and collusion are the root causes of excess profits, weakening one of the primary 
justifications for denying mergers of banks and nonbanks alike. 
This paper explores whether the Federal Reserve Board of Governors' commercial bank 
merger policy changed around 1980, and whether these changes were consistent with contem-
poraneous regulatory, political, and scholarly developments. The determinants of the Board's 
merger policy both before and after the early 1980s are estimated using a binomial probit model. 
The results suggest that the Board revised its overall merger policy consistent with changes in the 
Justice Department's Merger Guidelines, but was only marginally influenced by changes in the 
banking cost and industrial organization literature. Although merger policy became more relaxed 
as Reagan appointees were added to the Board, the possibility that this loosening was a response 
to the increased competition in financial markets could not be dismissed. 
II. The Changing Regulatory Environment 
The Banking Acts of 1933 and 1935 were designed to stabilize the banking sector and prevent the 
reoccurrence of widespread bank failures. In addition to introducing insurance to protect small 
depositors in failed banks, these laws aimed to curb "excessive" competition among banks by 
capping the rates banks could pay to attract funds, allowing federal regulators increased control 
over entry by new banks, and restricting the services banks could provide. If judged by the virtual 
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nonexistence of post-war bank failures, these laws were highly successful. By the 1970s, however, 
critics of regulation were arguing that this stability came at the cost of controlled deposit rates and 
unacceptably low levels of service, innovation, and operating efficiency. Though these arguments 
were based on theoretical rather than empirical evidence, they were successful. The Depository 
Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 and Garn-St. Germain Depository 
Institution Act of 1982 exposed banks to potential competitors from other geographic and product 
markets. The Acts eliminated interest rate ceilings, permitted thrifts to offer products previously 
limited to banks (e.g., consumer loans, commercial paper, trust accounts, credit cards), and 
allowed mergers between banks and thrifts and across state lines. 
It seems sensible that bank regulators would have eased their merger policies in response to 
deregulation. Ceteris paribus, a merger of two incumbent banks holds less potential for anticom-
petitive effects if the market is open to greater numbers and types of competitors. In addition, 
allowing the market for corporate control to operate more or less freely would help identify and 
discipline those banks not making the efficiency gains envisioned by proponents of deregulation. 
It also seems sensible that bank merger policy after 1980 would have been shaped by a series 
of other phenomena that occurred around that time, including: changes in the economic theories 
of imperfect competition; changes in the empirical evidence necessary to support such theories; 
revised estimates of efficient scale in banking; a more laissez faire merger antitrust policy in 
general; and a shift in the political composition of the Board of Governors. Rhoades and Burke 
[20, 444] surveyed some of these changes, and concluded that "a strong confluence of political 
and economic developments provided the foundation" for an easing of bank and nonbank merger 
antitrust in the 1980s. 
The New Learning and Merger Antitrust 
The well-known reticence of the Reagan Administration to challenge mergers was a sharp con-
trast to the previous twenty years of strict merger policy that focussed on little else but restraining 
market concentration. The pre-Reagan policies were based on the conventional wisdom that high 
concentration allows oligopolistic coordination, which in turn leads to reduced output, increased 
prices, and excess profits. The "structure-performance" theory was supported by scores of em-
pirical studies showing positive relationships between concentration and profits. The 1968 De-
partment of Justice Merger Guidelines were consistent with this theory and evidence, employing 
rigid formulae based almost solely on market shares. The 1968 Guidelines were tight, allowing 
the DO J to challenge mergers between firms with a combined market share of as little as 8%, and 
in many cases Justice argued for artificially small market definitions that effectively tightened the 
Guidelines further. The liberal Warren Court proved an ally in these proceedings, since efforts to 
restrain concentration were consistent with that Court's interventionist social agenda.1 
In the 1970s a "new learning" in industrial organization theory, usually associated with the 
University of Chicago, sought to explain the concentration-profits correlation without reference 
to collusion. Demsetz [7] and others argued that firms with competitive advantages over their 
rivals—superior service or product quality, efficiencies in production or distribution, etc.—gain 
large market shares and high profits. Thus, high profit firms do tend to be found in highly con-
centrated markets, but only because the large market shares of these successful firms influence 
concentration statistics upward. In such cases, a highly concentrated market is said to have an 
1. See Scherer and Ross [21, 176-94] for an historical overview of the U.S. government's merger antitrust policies. 
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"efficient structure." The efficient-structure theory was naturally appealing to the pro-business 
Reagan Administration because it attributed business growth and profitability to efficient produc-
tion and satisfied consumers. Baumol, Panzar, and Willig's highly influential Contestable Markets 
and the Theory of Industrial Organization [3], which emphasized that potential entry might ade-
quately discipline market incumbents, also provided support for the Administration's laissez faire 
predilections. The influence of these theoretic developments are clearly present in the revised 
1982 and 1984 Merger Guidelines, which increased the concentration levels necessary to invite a 
Justice Department challenge and relaxed the scrutiny of mergers when entry barriers were low. 
The Department of Justice can file suit to undo mergers approved by the bank regulators that 
it feels are anticompetitive, but Justice is powerless to retroactively allow applications denied by 
the regulators. Thus, Justice can use the courts to force regulators to comply with a tightened 
merger policy, but not to bring regulators into line with a looser merger policy. This asymme-
try gave bank regulators a range of policy choices during the 1980s: relax merger policy along 
with Justice at one extreme, or continue to practice a merger policy consistent with the relatively 
stricter pre-Reagan standards at the other extreme. 
The Empirical Literature in Industrial Organization 
The relationship between market concentration and market profits has been tested more often than 
any other relationship in industrial organization. In a survey of concentration-profits studies of 
(mostly) manufacturing industries, Weiss [27, 202] found that "the bulk of the studies show a 
significant positive effect of concentration on profits or margins." In a survey of similar studies of 
the banking industry, Gilbert [10, 636] concluded that "the better studies report a significant influ-
ence of market concentration on the performance measures, with signs implied by the structure-
performance hypothesis." 2 These results supported the theories of oligopoly and collusion on 
which the strict merger antitrust of the 1960s and 1970s rested. 
The performance measures most often used in these studies were the return on assets, equity, 
or sales, aggregated at the market level. Proponents of the new learning criticized this approach, 
pointing out that aggregated data obscured important firm level relationships. Using non-financial 
firm level data, Ravenscraft [18] found no relationship between firm profits and market concen-
tration, but a positive relationship between firm profits and market share. Using firm level data 
for commercial banks, Smirlock [22] found that market share dominated market concentration in 
explaining bank profits. Both authors concluded that the results supported the efficient structure 
hypothesis. In a study of small commercial banks, Rhoades [20] also found that market share 
was a source of high profits, but argued that, since this relationship was found in unconcentrated 
and highly concentrated markets alike, the results did not support the efficient structure hypothe-
sis.3 In light of these and numerous other studies, Scherer and Ross [21] summarized the earlier 
concentration-profits results as "spurious, a construct of aggregating from the line of business to 
the industry level." 
If the debate had ended with these studies, one would have expected the Board to deempha-
size market concentration during the 1980s. However, the debate over the impact of concentration 
2. Gilbert [10] drew this conclusion reluctantly, however, since only about half of the studies he reviewed found a 
significant relationship between concentration and performance. Gilbert also notes that the efficient-structure hypothesis 
had not yet been adequately tested for banking markets. 
3. Rhoades [19] suggests that high market share may confer a product differentiation advantage that in turn allows 
a pricing premium. 
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in banking markets remains unsettled to date. Many of the more recent studies exploit survey data 
to test the impact of concentration on prices rather than on profits, an approach that had been 
used frequently during the 1960s and 1970s with mixed results, perhaps due to poor quality price 
data. 4 Hannan [11] found concentration to be positively related to loan rates. Berger and Hannan 
[5, 291] found a positive relationship between concentration and deposit rates, and concluded that 
the results "strongly supported the structure-performance hypothesis." 
For the purposes of this study, it is important to recognize that this debate, the onset of which 
occurred at roughly the same time that other determinants of bank merger policy were changing, 
marked a potential unwinding of an earlier conventional wisdom. 
The Banking Cost Literature 
The Bank Merger and Bank Holding Company Act of 1966 [2] required bank regulators to deny 
mergers that substantially reduced competition unless "the anticompetitive effects of the proposed 
transaction are clearly outweighed in the public interest by the probable effect of the transaction 
in meeting the convenience and needs of the community to be served." Since efficient banks 
are better able to meet the convenience and needs of the community (lower prices, improved 
services), this legislation could be interpreted as encouraging regulators to allow mergers that 
generated efficiencies large enough to offset their anticompetitive effects. 
The welfare tradeoff between market power and productive efficiency was formalized by 
Williamson [28]. The 1984 Merger Guidelines did not allow a full-blown Williamson efficien-
cies defense, but they allowed for the first time the antitrust authority to consider efficiencies if 
convincing evidence existed that those gains would not be achieved but for the merger. In prac-
tice, however, it is doubtful whether efficiencies were considered even at the margin. According 
to Scherer and Ross [21, 188], the Justice Department "accepted few if any merger efficiency 
defenses during the first three years" of the 1984 Guidelines, and the courts have never accepted 
efficiencies as the basis for allowing an anticompetitive merger.5 
If bank merger regulators did consider efficiencies during the time period examined here 
(1963 to 1990), the focus would have been on scale economies. Prior to the 1980s virtually all 
sizes of banks were thought to exhibit increasing returns to scale. Most banking cost studies 
produced negatively-sloped unit cost functions that asymptotically approached constant returns. 
Humphrey [15] discusses the deficiencies of these studies, and it is now generally accepted that 
this "L-shape" was an artifact of using the Cobb-Douglas functional form, a constant elasticity 
of scale specification incapable of producing a "U-shaped" unit cost function. In the early 1980s 
economists began substituting the translog functional form for the Cobb-Douglas. Humphrey [14] 
discusses the consequences of this change, and reviews the differences among the numerous trans-
log studies that followed. In the first of these studies, Benston, Hanweck, and Humphrey [4] 
concluded that the optimal-sized banking office was between $10 and $25 million (1978 dollars) 
of deposits, beyond which scale diseconomies set in. A large number of translog studies followed 
in quick succession; most of these studies found a U-shape as well, with modest scale econo-
mies exhausted below $100 to $200 million (current dollars), followed eventually by modest scale 
diseconomies. 6 
4 . See Smirlock [22] and Gilbert [10] for a discussion of these earlier studies. 
5. Brown Shoe (1962), Philadelphia National Bank (1963), and Proctor & Gamble (1967) are the precedents. 
6. Studies focussing exclusively on large banks did not appear until 1984. Many of these large bank studies found 
modest scale economies that were not exhausted until well above $1,000 million in deposits. 
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The first studies to test separately for scope economies appeared in 1984. Mester [16] and 
Clark [6] review the early part of this literature and report only a smattering of evidence of scope 
economies between only a few output pairs. The results suggest that full service banks offering a 
wide range of services have no cost advantage over financial "boutiques" specializing in a subset 
of those services. 
Overall, the post-1980 cost studies suggested that bank mergers were less likely to produce 
cost savings—either by increasing a bank's size or by diversifying its product mix—than was 
previously thought. Although the revised Merger Guidelines considered cost efficiencies for the 
first time, the results in the banking cost literature made an efficiencies defense more difficult to 
justify.7 
The Composition of the Board 
The relaxed concentration, entry barrier, and efficiency standards of the 1982 and 1984 Merger 
Guidelines were a clear a statement of the Reagan Administration's free market ideology. The 
revisions were also consistent with changes in the theoretical and empirical literature in industrial 
organization. To what degree the Guidelines were loosened in response to academic develop-
ments, or whether changes in the academic literature were a convenient justification for relaxing 
the Guidelines, is not clear. Regardless, Waldman [26, 127] reports that the revised Guidelines 
were an ex post confirmation of a shift in antitrust policy that began immediately at the outset of 
the Reagan Administration in 1981. 
Unlike rewriting policy guidelines, changing the way that the Board of Governors imple-
ments policy takes time. Each of the seven governors is appointed to a nonrenewable term of 
14 years, with a new governor being appointed every two years. Although governors sometimes 
leave the Board before completing their terms, a President cannot normally change the Board's 
ideological majority during his first term in office. Reagan did not appoint a governor until 1982, 
did not have a majority of appointees on the Board until 1986, and not until August of 1987 
were all seven governors Reagan appointees. Once Reagan appointees held a majority on the 
Board, however, bank merger policy could have loosened even without changes in the academic 
literature; as it happened, the new learning and contestable markets theories may have provided 
intellectual "cover" for an ideologically driven policy change. 
III. Statistical Model and Data 
Let Q be the dependent variable in a binomial probit model of the Board's merger policy, where 
Q = 1 when an application for merger is denied by the Board. The probit model estimates the 
probability of application denial, both before and after deregulation, as a function of market con-
centration, the market share and operating scale of the merging banks, branching barriers to entry, 
the presence of thrift institutions in the relevant market, and the political composition of the Board 
at the time of the merger order. 
A pre-deregulation list of 248 horizontal merger applications was generated from merger 
7. More recently, economists have begun to study whether banks tend to operate close to the efficient production 
frontier. Evanoff [8] surveyed this literature and concluded that technical inefficiencies are typically 20 to 30 percent of 
banking costs, a potential source of savings larger than scale economies. Because these studies did not appear in the 
literature in large numbers until 1990, the Board could not have incorporated their results in its 1983-1990 merger policy. 
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orders published in the Federal Reserve Bulletin between 1963 and 1980, and a post-deregulation 
list of 168 horizontal merger applications was generated from the same source between 1983 and 
1990.8 The end points of the sample periods correspond with changes in the economics literature, 
the antitrust environment, and banking legislation. The Justice Department's antitrust authority to 
challenge bank mergers, and a market definition that distinguished commercial banks from thrift 
institutions, were established in the 1963 Philadelphia National Bank decision.9 The first merger 
order in which the Board recognized thrifts to be competitors of commercial banks was published 
in 1980.10 The 1982 DOJ Merger Guidelines, the bank deregulatory acts, and the first of the 
pivotal empirical studies mentioned above all occurred slightly before or coincident with 1983. 
The first Justice Department challenge of a Board-approved merger under the 1982-84 Merger 
Guidelines occurred in 1990.11 
Every application for merger or acquisition published in the Federal Reserve Bulletin during 
the sample periods that had horizontal content (i.e., a joint presence in a geographic market prior 
to the application) was considered for the sample. When the published merger order did not iden-
tify explicitly a "relevant" geographic market, the smallest geographic area discussed in the order 
(city, county, or SMS A) was selected. A bank was considered to be acquired only if the trans-
action resulted in at least 50% ownership of the acquired bank's stock. Mergers involving foreign 
banks, de novo banks, banks in weak financial condition, banks where managerial succession was 
at issue, and banks that were commonly controlled prior to the merger, were excluded, as well as 
mergers for which all of the explanatory variables in the model could not be observed. 
In recent years, very few orders denying a merger have been published. Only 4 of the 168 
merger orders in the 1983-1990 sample were outright denials. Although the low frequency of 
denials appears to be prima facie evidence of a relaxed merger stance by the Board, it might 
also reflect improved communication between Board staff and merger applicants early in the 
application process. When Board staff feels that the merger as proposed has competitive prob-
lems, the applicants often include in the application a proposal to divest questionable branches 
rather than risk being denied, thus avoiding the lost time and expense of refiling. This practice 
of "fix it first" occurred more frequently during the 1980s.12 In order to control for this change, 
whenever the merger order indicated that the Board's approval rested on such divestitures, the 
merger was treated as a denied application (Q = 1) between the approved (merged) firm and 
the banks or branches divested in the relevant market. This adjustment increased the number of 
post-deregulation denials to 20. Although treating approvals conditional on divestitures as out-
right denials presents a measurement problem, this adjustment should not result in any serious 
bias. Since in these cases approval was clearly conditional on divestiture, it is just as clear that an 
application that did not include these divestitures would have been denied. 
Herfindahl indices (HH) were available for the post-1983 observations, but none of the stan-
8. Prior to 1970, all merger applications for which the Fed was the principal regulator appeared in the Federal Re-
serve Bulletin [9]. Since then, most merger decisions have been delegated to the regional Federal Reserve Banks. Merger 
orders are now published in the FRB only if the Board has significant concerns about the competitive impact of the merger, 
the financial or organizational stability of the acquiring bank, or community reinvestment record of the acquirer. 
9. In PNB [24], the Court ruled that the term commercial banking denotes an unique cluster of products and 
services (e.g., checking, trust administration, various kinds of credit) that at the time effectively insulated banks from 
competition by thrifts and other financial intermediaries. 
10. See Federal Reserve Bulletin [9, July 1980, pp. 576-577]. 
11. See 17.5. v. First Hawaiian [23]. 
12. See Holder [12, note 9]. 
BANK MERGER REGULATION, 1963-1990 75 
dard measures of market concentration was uniformly available for the pre-1980 sample period. 1 3 
The number of commercial banks (AO in the relevant market was reported in all merger orders, 
however, and can be used to construct a consistent measure of concentration across samples. 
Gilbert [10] reports on ten concentration-profit studies that used N to measure concentration. N 
had a significant impact on profits in five of the studies, and in two of the others neither N or more 
standard measures of concentration significantly impacted profits. This study uses the inverse of 
N (NINV) to measure concentration. NINV is theoretically superior to N since it gives additional 
firms less weight as the number of market competitors increases, and NINV was more highly 
correlated with HH (+ .69) than was N ( - . 48 ) for the post-1983 observations. Since NINV is a 
bank-only measure, a thrift dummy (TH) was included in the post-1983 tests to control for com-
petition from thrifts, where TH = 1 when the merger order characterized thrift competition as 
"significant." 1 4 
Market share was measured by the share of total commercial bank deposits in the relevant 
market held by the larger (57) and the smaller (52) of the merging organizations. The change 
in the Herfindahl index (A// / / = 2 • SI • S2) measures the increase in market concentration due 
to the merger. Entry barriers were measured by a branching dummy (BP), where BP = 1 when 
the merger occurred in a unit banking or limited branch banking state.1 5 Scale was measured by 
the amount of deposits, in millions of 1980 dollars, held by the larger (Dl) and smaller (D2) 
banks in the relevant geographic market. The post-1983 political composition of the Board was 
measured by the percentage of governors on the date of the merger order that had been appointed 
by President Reagan (%RR). Table I has summary statistics for all variables. 
The probit model was specified as follows: 
Q=<P[fio + jSi • NINV + j8 2 • SI + / 3 3 • S2 + / 3 4 • A/// / + p5 • A//// • BP + f36 • BP 
+ j8 7 -DI + (3SD2 + £9 • (D2 - X) • DS + j 3 1 0 • TH + pu • %RR + e]. 
PNINV
 a n d P AHH a r e expected to be positive prior to 1980, reflecting the antitrust policies of the 
time. P N I N V and fi^H w i U be smaller or statistically insignificant in the later sample if the Board 
embraced the de-emphasis of concentration in the industrial organization literature. (HH will be 
used in place of NINV in alternate post-1983 specifications, and is expected to behave similarly.) 
PSI and fiS2 are both expected to be positive prior to 1980, but could become negative after 1983 
if the Board identified large banks with efficient operations and hence desired that assets flow 
toward these firms. 
BP enters the model both linearly and interactively with AHH. fiBP is expected to be posi-
tive in both samples; a merger is more likely to increase market power in branching-restricted 
states because the competitor lost to merger must be replaced by a new entrant. De novo banks 
require fixed start-up costs (a charter, a board of directors, developing goodwill) that an already 
existing bank branching into the same market does not. fiBP may be smaller after 1983 if the 
Board's policy anticipated the phase-out of state branching laws in the 1980s. P^HHBP w ^ be 
13. Until 1987 the Board calculated a bank-only Herfindahl index, after which it used an adjusted Herfindahl index 
that gave market deposits in thrifts a 50% weight. Herfindahl indices constructed from the Summary of Deposit data also 
are inadequate, since the geographic markets used in this source do not always match the relevant market in the merger 
orders. 
14. For an example, see Federal Reserve Bulletin [9, August 1984, p. 652, note 7]. 
15. The BP variable was constructed from Amel [1]. 
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1963-1980 1983-1990 
mean standard deviation mean standard deviation 
NINV .0871 .0809 .0798 .0645 
HH — — 1831 739 
A//// 248 557 241 333 
SI 17.79% 14.71% 19.59% 12.68% 
S2 4.45% 5.87% 5.23% 5.63% 
Dl $404.29 $777.97 $932.52 $2053.67 
D2 $39.74 $64.78 $167.15 $454.66 
%RR — — .6180 .3284 
=0 = 1 =0 = 1 
Q 164 84 148 20 
BP 124 124 136 32 
TH — — 97 71 
positive if the Board was more sensitive to concentration in markets where entry barriers were 
high, particularly in the post-1983 model given the emphasis on entry barriers in the revised 
Merger Guidelines. 
TH and %RR appear only in the post-1983 model. is expected to be negative if gover-
nors appointed by Reagan were less disposed to market intervention than governors appointed by 
Reagan's predecessors. (3TH is expected to be negative, since the presence of additional nonbank 
competitors should reduce the likelihood of denial. 
If the Board was at all sensitive to merger-induced efficiencies, the coefficients on the Dl 
and D2 variables might capture the relationship between the banking cost literature and Board's 
merger policy. The probit specification shown above employs a spline function built around D2, 
where X is assumed to be the Board's perception of minimum efficient scale (MES), and DS is 
a dummy variable equal to one when D2 > MES. Thus, pD2 measures the responsiveness of the 
Board to changes in scale below MES, and / 3 D 2 + Po2-x measures the same thing for changes in 
scale above MES. (The model will be estimated for various values of X.) If the Board considered 
the potential for scale economies, / 3 D 2 will be positive (i.e., as the target bank moves closer to 
MES, the potential for scale economies from the merger decreases, so the probability of denial 
increases). pD2 + $DI-X is expected to be zero if scale had no effect on the probability of denial 
beyond MES. Of course, the Board's perception of MES before 1980 or after 1983 is not known. 
Furthermore, only one of the merger orders mentioned scale economies as a reason for approv-
ing a merger, so a statistically significant /3 D 2 may capture some other, scale-related feature of 
Board policy.16 Dl enters the model as a linear variable, because the average acquiring bank in 
the samples had probably exhausted opportunities for significant scale economies (see Table I). 
PD1 is expected to be positive. 
16. See Federal Reserve Bulletin [9, December 1987, p. 923]. In discussions on this issue, long-time Board staff 
members indicated to the author that the Board has never practiced an efficiencies defense, either before or after deregu-
lation. 
Table I. Summary Statistics, Dollars in Millions 
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Table II. Goodness of Fit Measures from Probit Spline Regressions 
1963-80 1983-90 
NINV NINV HH 
D2 ($M) R2 - ln(£) R2 - ln(£) R2 - ln(£) 
$10 .3962 101.7 .5786 20.6 .5853 20.3 
20 .4356 96.7 .5893 19.5 .6011 19.1 
25 .4320 97.4 .5887 19.4 .5996 19.1 
30 .4371 96.9 .5905 19.3 .5991 19.0 
35 .4441 96.0 .5916 19.3 .5998 19.0 
40 .4458 95.8 .5908 19.3 .5988 19.0 
45 .4497 95.1 .5918 19.3 .5998 18.9 
50 .4512 95.0 .5892 19.4 .5972 19.0 
55 .4493 95.1 .5871 19.6 .5940 19.2 
60 .4466 95.3 .5856 19.7 .5919 19.3 
70 .4461 95.4 .5836 19.9 .5887 19.5 
80 .4450 95.5 .5822 20.0 .5865 19.6 
90 .4403 95.7 .5811 20.1 .5849 19.7 
100 .4380 95.7 .5804 20.2 .5838 19.8 
150 .4380 95.4 .5817 20.2 .5834 19.9 
200 .4301 95.8 .5836 20.2 .5845 19.9 
500 did not converge .5808 20.4 .5827 20.1 
1000 did not converge .5802 20.4 .5821 20.1 
IV. Results 
Goodness-of-fit statistics (adjusted R2 and log-likelihood ratio) for the pre-1980 and post-1983 
models, estimated using values of X between $10 million and $1,000 million, are shown in 
Table II. Assuming that the value of X that maximizes the model's fit is the Board's implicit 
definition of MES, the results in Table II offer at most only weak evidence that the Board revised 
its working definition of MES downward along with changes in the banking cost literature. Pre-
1980 fit clearly peaks at X = $50 million, while post-1983 fit is maximized between X = $20 and 
X = $45. 1 7 
The results of the best-fitting spline regressions (pre-1980 X = $50 million, post-1983 X = 
$45 million) are shown in Tables III and IV along with alternate specifications. SI and S2 are 
excluded from equations (1), (4), and (7), while kHH and AHH • BP are excluded from equations 
(3), (6), and (9). A/ / / / is related to the market share variables by construction, and although this 
relationship is not linear, these two sets of variables share the same information and as a result 
are not orthogonal. Thus, these six alternate specifications were estimated in order to (a) observe 
whether possible colinearity between these variables affects the estimated standard errors of the 
parameters, and (b) estimate separately the impacts of the A// / / variables and the market share 
variables on the probability of Board denial. 
17. The best pre-1980 fit (X = $50M, R2 = .4512) was statistically different from the worst pre-1980 fit (X = 
$10M, R2 = .3962) at the 15% level of significance. The best and worst post-1983 fits were different at only the 29% 
level. To get these results, the sum of squared errors (ESS) from the poorer fitting model was divided by ESS from the 
better fitting model. The resulting ratio follows an F distribution with identical degrees of freedom in the numerator and 
denominator [17, 149]. This procedure is appropriate for comparing JR 2 ,s since ESS is the only element in the R2,s that 
varies across models. 
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Table III. Probit Estimations, 1963-1980 
(1) (2) (3) 
C -3.1105 a -4.0009 a -3.5982 a 
(.4380) (.5237) (.4711) 
NINV 10.22203 6.2082b 6.0946b 
(2.5069) (2.7236) (2.8094) 
SJ — .0589a .0514a 
(.0121) (.0105) 
S2 — .1199b .0647b 
(.0479) (.0305) 
hHH .0023a - .0004 — 
(.0007) (.4321) 
A//// • BP -.0014° - .0011 c — 
(.0008) (.0007) 
BP .7833a .8069a .5238b 
(.2715) (.2808) (.2275) 
DJ .0003b .0001 .0001 
(.0001) (.0002) (.0002) 
D2 .0328a .0401a .0396a 
(.0072) (.0081) (.0080) 
(D2-X)-DS -.0349 a - .0383 a -.0382 a 
(.0077) (.0085) (.0084) 
adjusted R2 .3785 .4512 .4406 
0 33.85% 26.93% 29.13% 
Notes: Dependent variable is Q. N = 248. X = $50 million. Standard errors are in parentheses. Superscripts a, b, 
and c indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
The results in Table IV suggest that some of the standard errors were exaggerated by co-
linearity in the post-1983 data. When SI and S2 are included in the post-1983 model, P&HHBP> 
PNINV* a n d PHH a ^ l ° s e ^ e i r statistical significance even though their magnitudes remained rela-
tively unchanged. 1 8 Removing SI and S2 apparently results in a specification error. In the post-
1983 model, R2 falls significantly and the absolute sizes of estimated / 3 D / , (3D2, and P(D2-X)-DS 
are sharply lower. R2 also falls in the pre-1980 model, but the estimated parameters and standard 
errors for these three variables are relatively unaffected.19 
Comparing the results across equations (1), (4), and (7) may reveal a change in the Board's 
policy with respect to entry barriers after 1983. Prior to 1980, fiBP and P^HH were both positive 
and highly significant andP&HHBP w a s negative and significant. While these results indicate that 
the Board was less likely to approve mergers in markets where entry was difficult, or mergers 
that increased concentration by large amounts, the results also suggest that the Board did not 
become more sensitive to increases in concentration when entry was unlikely. In contrast, after 
18. This diagnosis is supported by relatively high pair-wise correlations between these variables and the market share 
variables. In the post-1983 data, p(57,NINV) = .504, p{Sl,HH) = .598, p(S2,NINV) = .516, andp(S2, &HH) = .907. 
19. Using the test described in note 17, the adjusted R2 values in equation pair (1), (2); equation pair (4), (5); and 
equation pair (7), (8) were significantly different from each other at the 10 percent, 1 percent, and 1 percent levels, re-
spectively. Although pre-1980 correlations involving SI and S2 were similar to the high post-1983 correlations, the effects 
of colinearity were likely less serious due to the larger number of pre-1980 observations. 
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Table IV. Probit Estimations, 1983-1990 
(4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
c -.9113 -4.6504 b -4.2972 a -1.8814 b -5.0307 b -4.7312 3 
(.6752) (2.3772) (1.4337) (.8033) (2.4088) (1.5942) 
NINV 9.5493b 9.0086 9.0063 — — — 
(4.3572) (7.5770) (7.5089) 
HH — — — .0010a .0008 .0008 
(.0003) (.0006) (.0006) 
SI — .1694a .1569a — .1588a .1519a 
(.0590) (.0434) (.0551) (.0429) 
S2 — .0539 -.0664 — .0664 -.0314 
(.1967) (.0649) (.1947) (.0526) 
kHH .0005 -.0019 — .0008 -.0016 — 
(.0006) (.0030) (.0005) (.0029) 
MIH'BP .0026b .0022 — .0026b .0024 — 
(.0013) (.0020) (.0013) (.0019) 
BP - .5386 .2219 .8986 -.3123 .4035 1.1442c 
(.6449) (1.0130) (.6093) (.6402) (.9985) (.6149) 
Dl - .0003 -.0020 -.0024 b -.0006 -.0024 c - .0028 b 
(.0005) (.0013) (.0012) (.0005) (.0014) (.0013) 
D2 .0052 .0465b .0529b .0065 .0453° .0525b 
(.0145) (.0273) (.0251) (.0136) (.0268) (.0249) 
(D2 -X)DS - .0045 -.0425 - .0481 b -.0055 -.0409 -.0475 b 
(.0145) (.0275) (.0247) (.0136) (.0268) (.0243) 
TH -1.2707 3 -2.7269 a -2.5558 a -1.3342 a -2.8906 3 -2.6612 3 
(.4586) (1.0076) (.9225) (.4748) (1.0852) (.9631) 
%RR -2.1806 3 -3.5583 a -3.6684 a -2.5890 3 -4.1223 3 -4.1885 3 
(.6561) (1.2582) (1.2666) (.7613) (1.4873) (1.4848) 
adjusted R 2 .3893 .5918 .5742 .4121 .5988 .5775 
(p 2.70% 0.01% 0.01% 1.36% 0.01% 0.019 
Notes: Dependent variable is Q. N = 168. X = $45 million. Standard errors are in parentheses. Superscripts a, b, 
and c indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
1983 neither BP or A/ / / / by themselves had a significant impact on the probability of denial, but 
(3AjiHBP w a s positive and significant. These results suggest that the Board reacted strongly to large 
increases in concentration only when it was unlikely that entry would mitigate the reduction in 
competition. The significance of fi^HH.BP (coupled with the insignificance of fiBP and (3&HH) after 
1983 is consistent with the more sophisticated joint treatment of concentration and entry barriers 
in the 1982-84 Merger Guidelines. The insignificance of fiBP after 1983 may also indicate that 
the Board was anticipating the eventual phase-out of intra-state branching restrictions. 
Prior to 1980, /3NINV, fiSI, and / 3 5 2 had the expected signs and were statistically signifi-
cant, evidence that the Board was more likely to deny mergers between firms with high market 
shares and/or mergers in highly concentrated markets. After 1983, fiNINV was approximately the 
same size, and remained statistically significant (albeit at a slightly lower level) in equation (4). 
(3HH followed the same pattern as ) 8 M / V V . Although interpretation of these results requires some 
judgement given the probable presence of colinearity in the post-1983 data, they suggest that 
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the Board's treatment of market concentration remained roughly constant across time, despite the 
attention given to efficient-structure theories in the theoretical and empirical literature. Moreover, 
the significant negative coefficients that would indicate a conversion to a Chicago school ideol-
ogy were not present on either market share variable. f3S] remained significant and nearly tripled 
in size, but fiS2 lost its statistical significance. This combination of changes in the market share 
coefficients may indicate an increased concern about markets with dominant firms.20 
After 1983, the Board appears to have integrated its analysis of concentration and market 
share with other market conditions. As discussed above, the Board's concern about increases in 
concentration appeared to be limited to markets where entry was difficult. The loss of significance 
of both fiS2 and pBP after 1983, together with the significant and negative pTH, may indicate 
that, in the Board's view, the larger number of potential competitors in the post-deregulation 
environment made the loss of an existing competitor less serious. 
In February 1985, the Justice Department announced that it would not ordinarily challenge 
a bank merger unless the Herfindahl index exceeded 1800 in the relevant market and increased 
by more than 200 points as a result of the merger.21 Alternate versions of equations (4), (5), (7), 
and (8) were estimated (not shown) to test whether the "1800/200" rule had an impact on denial 
above and beyond the other variables in the model. In these equations, A//// • BP was replaced by 
two other variables: D1800, a dummy equal to one when HH > 1800, and the interactive variable 
D1800 • AHH. Porno w a s positive throughout but was significant in only one of the four equa-
tions, and PDJ8OO ' was negative and nonsignificant throughout. These results are consistent 
with those found by Holder [13], who, in an extensive analysis of the mitigating factors cited by 
the Board in approved merger applications, found that the 1800/200 rule was seldom binding. 
Before 1980, (3D2 was positive and significant, PD2-X was negative and significant, and 
their sum was not significantly different from zero. 2 2 Hence, the Board was less likely to deny 
a merger the more sub-optimal the smaller bank, but was indifferent to increases in scale when 
the smaller bank was above $50 million in assets. /3D1 was positive and small, and was signifi-
cantly different from zero only in equation (1)—since the average acquiring bank had well over 
$50 million in assets, the results for Dl and D2 are consistent with each other. Overall, the scale 
coefficients were relatively unchanged after 1983. 2 3 fiD2 and fio2-x maintained nearly the same 
size and significance in equations (5), (6), (8), and (9) as in the pre-1980 equations. / 3 D y turned 
negative but remained small, and was insignificant in half of the post-1933 equations. Although 
both the pre-1980 and post-1983 results are consistent with a policy encouraging mergers that 
removed sub-optimal banks from the market, there is little corroborating evidence that the Board 
20. Citing three post-1983 merger applications as examples, Holder [13, 39-40] reports that when market concen-
tration was driven by the shares of one or two dominant firms, this fact "worked in favor of mergers that involved other 
institutions in the market and against approval of transactions involving the dominant firmCs)." 
21. See Holder [12, 31]. Of the 168 merger orders in the post-1983 sample, 120 came after 1985. Of these 120, 
35 exceeded the 1800/200 threshold. Of these 35, the Board denied (or would have denied had the application not been 
restructured) only 7. 
22. The following procedure was used to test the hypothesis that / 3 D 2 + Pd2-x = 0. A linear (non-spline) specifi-
cation model was estimated for a subsample that included only applications having D2 > X. In these tests, $ m w a s n o t 
significantly different from zero in the pre-1980 or post-1983 versions of this model. 
23. Alternate specifications (not shown) were estimated using the natural log of D2 in place of the spline variables 
(D2 and (D2 - X) • DS). The natural log shape (\nD2) mimics the pre-1980 Cobb-Douglas estimates of continuous, 
though diminishing, scale economies for all sizes of banks. /3\nD2 w a s positive and highly significant (1 percent level) 
in pre-1980 regressions, but was positive and statistically insignificant in post-1983 regressions. Compared to the spline 
model, the natural log model provided a worse fit for the post-1983 data (R2 of .5591 vs. .5998 for the spline) and about 
the same fit for the pre-1980 data (R2 of .4621 vs. .4512 for the spline). 
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was practicing an efficiencies defense, and these results may be capturing some other scale-related 
phenomenon. Regardless, there is no evidence here that the Board changed its treatment of scale 
in response to changes in the banking cost literature. 
To the extent that the above results represent actual changes in the Board's merger policy, 
they occurred simultaneous with an across-the-board easing of merger policy. As expected, as 
more of the governors became Reagan appointees, the probability of denial grew smal le r—P%RR 
was negative and statistically significant. The estimated probability <P that the average merger ap-
plication (i.e., an application having sample means for each variable) would have been denied was 
between 26 and 34 percent between 1963 and 1980. After 1983, average <P fell below 3 percent, 
a change that is consistent with a series of non-mutually exclusive explanations: (1) earlier contact 
with Board staff resulted in divestitures of questionable branches prior to filing the application, 
(2) the 1980s Justice Department Merger Guidelines—as implemented by the Board—presented 
clearer standards for banks than did the 1968 Guidelines, (3) bank merger policy relaxed in recog-
nition of the increase in actual and potential competition after deregulation, and (4) bank merger 
policy became more lax due to a change in ideology at the Board. 
Simulations that evaluate equations (2) and (5) for 36 hypothetical merger scenarios are 
shown in Table V. The scenarios are organized into three groups that bracket the concentration 
thresholds in the 1982-84 Merger Guidelines as amended for bank mergers. 2 4 Under these Guide-
lines, mergers in group A were unlikely to be challenged; mergers in group C were likely to be 
challenged; and mergers in group B were less likely to be challenged if they caused efficiency 
gains but more likely to be challenged if entry barriers were high. The superscript A denotes 
"predicts approval" (D denotes "predicts denial"), and appears whenever the probability 0.500 
fell above (below) a 90% confidence interval around estimated 0. 
Under the pre-1980 regime, there was a high degree of statistical certainty that 12 mergers 
would have been denied, and 12 mergers would have been approved. After 1983, the ratio of 
approvals to denials remained reasonably unchanged prior to the Reagan appointments (i.e., in 
simulations with %RR set equal to zero), with a high degree of certainty that 14 mergers would 
have been denied, and 9 mergers would have been approved. This contrasts dramatically with 
the results of the simulation after the Reagan appointments (i.e., %RR set equal to 1) in which 
33 mergers would have been approved and none denied. While this exercise demonstrates force-
fully the extent to which merger policy relaxed as additional Reagan appointees joined the Board, 
the results to not allow us to differentiate between explanations (3) and (4) above—the results 
may reflect the change in the Board's ideological composition, or they may reflect a recognition 
of increased competition that occurred coincidentally with the Reagan appointments. Moreover, 
any conclusion that ideology completely dominated economic analysis in the Board's post-1983 
merger policy would have to ignore the statistically significant coefficients on concentration, 
acquiring bank market share, and the presence of thrift competitors in the post-1983 model. 
24. See the 1982 and 1984 U.S. Department of Justice Merger Guidelines [25] and Federal Reserve Bulletin [9, 
October 1985, p. 796, note 10]. TH was set to zero in equation (5) for all 36 scenarios. Since HH was not available for 
both samples, post-deregulation data was used to estimate (OLS) the following model: 
NINV= - . 0 3 1 9 1 6 + . 0 0 0 0 6 0 - / / / / + .011742 • BP 
(.009813) (.000005) (.009215) 
the results of which were used to produce values for NINV that correspond to the HH scenario values of 1400, 1800, and 
2500 in Table V. 
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(2) (5, %RR = 0)(5, %RR = 1) 
<2> <2> 57 S2 BP D2 Dl 
A. HH = 1400, MiH = 50 
.036A .020A .000A 5.0% 5.0% 0 $25M $25M 
.036A .068A .000A 10.0 2.5 0 25 100 
.089A .316 .000A 20.0 1.25 0 25 400 
.168A .053A .000A 5.0 5.0 1 25 25 
.163A .146A .000A 10.0 2.5 1 25 100 
.299A .484 .000A 20.0 1.25 1 25 400 
.306A .146A .000A 5.0 5.0 0 100 100 
.241A .170A .000A 10.0 2.5 0 100 400 
.418 .037A .000A 20.0 1.25 0 100 1600 
.545 .270 .000A 5.0 5.0 1 100 100 
.548 .303 .000A 10.0 2.5 1 100 400 
.732° .090A .000A 20.0 1.25 1 100 1600 
B. HH = 1800, AHH = 200 
.206A .157A .000A 10.0% 10.0% 0 $25M $25M 
.204A .604 .000A 20.0 5.0 0 25 100 
.332A .946D .026A 30.0 3.33 0 25 225 
.433 .408 .000A 10.0 10.0 1 25 25 
.431 .851D .006A 20.0 5.0 1 25 100 
.587 .992° .121A 30.0 3.33 1 25 225 
.606 .496 .000A 10.0 10.0 0 100 100 
.607 .788 .003A 20.0 5.0 0 100 400 
.753 d .916D .015A 30.0 3.33 0 100 900 
.822D .778 .003A 10.0 10.0 1 100 100 
.823° .943d .024A 20.0 5.0 1 100 400 
.910D .984d .081A 30.0 3.33 1 100 900 
C. HH = 2500, AHH = 300 
.438 .396 .000A 12.5% 12.5% 0 $25M $25M 
.378A .742 .002A 20.0 7.5 0 25 67 
.493 .979° .065A 30.0 5.0 0 25 150 
.649 .770 .002A 12.5 12.5 1 25 25 
.591 .951D .028A 20.0 7.5 1 25 67 
.699D .998D .252 30.0 5.0 1 25 150 
.825° .768 .002A 12.5 12.5 0 100 100 
.784° .918° .015A 20.0 7.5 0 100 267 
.862° .986° .099A 0.0 5.0 0 100 600 
.848° .880D .008A 12.5 12.5 1 100 100 
.908° .992° .122 20.0 7.5 1 100 267 
.949° .999D .387 30.0 5.0 1 100 600 
Note: Superscripts A and D indicate projected approval and denial at 90 percent confidence level. 
Table V. Probability of Denial for Hypothetical Merger Scenarios 
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The post-1983/pre-Reagan simulation results (second column in Table V) suggest that the 
Board's merger policy conformed to the revised Merger Guidelines. None of the "unlikely to be 
challenged" group A scenarios were denied, and none of the "likely to be challenged" group C 
scenarios were approved. Consistent with the attention paid to entry barriers in the revised Guide-
lines, four of the six denials in the "likely to be challenged if9 group B scenarios occurred where 
BP = 1. Note that the majority of the pre-1980 approvals (10 of 12) occurred in scenarios with 
potential for scale economies (i.e., D2 = $25 million), but no similar pattern shows up in the 
post-1983 results. 
V. Conclusions 
During the early 1980s a confluence of events changed the economic, political, and regulatory 
underpinnings of bank merger policy. Decades old regulations of financial institutions were phased 
out, the Justice Department relaxed its overall merger antitrust policy, and appointments by Presi-
dent Reagan changed the ideological composition of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors. In 
addition, the scholarly literature in economics challenged the conventional wisdom regarding the 
impact of market concentration and bank scale on bank performance. This study finds evidence 
that the Board of Governor's bank merger policy responded to some, but not all, of these changes. 
There is strong evidence that the Board's merger policy became progressively more lax 
throughout the 1980s. Merger simulations based on a model estimated from the Board's actual 
merger decisions suggest that the percentage of governors appointed by President Reagan was a 
strong determinant of bank merger policy. A simulated Board comprised entirely of Reagan ap-
pointees approved 33 of 36 hypothetical mergers, including a majority of scenarios characterized 
as "likely to be challenged" under the 1982-84 Merger Guidelines. Although it is tempting to at-
tribute this relaxation to the laissez faire ideology of the Reagan appointees, it is equally possible 
that the Board adjusted its policies as the post-deregulation environment facing banks became 
increasingly competitive. Indeed, the results found here show that the Board relaxed its policy 
more in markets where thrift competition was significant. 
While it appears that the Board did alter its treatment of market structure after 1983, the 
changes fell far short of abandoning the structure-performance paradigm in favor of an efficient-
structure approach. For example, the Board remained more likely to deny mergers in highly 
concentrated markets, and its sensitivity to the market share of the acquiring bank increased. 
Furthermore, the post-1983 results suggest that (in contrast to the pre-1980 results) the Board 
became more sensitive to merger-induced increases in concentration when entry barriers were 
present, a more sophisticated policy consistent with revisions in the Justice Department's 1982 
and 1984 Merger Guidelines. 
The Board was less likely to deny acquisitions of sub-optimal size banks both before and after 
1980. Although these results suggest a merger policy that encouraged removing sub-optimal banks 
from the market, there is little corroborating evidence that the Board practiced an efficiencies de-
fense in either time period. Moreover, there was only marginal evidence that the Board changed 
its treatment of scale in response to changes in the banking cost literature. 
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